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Sławomir KOZIOŁ 
COGNITIVE LINGUISITICS AND POSTMODERNISM: IN SEARCH OF 
PARALLELS 
Cognitive linguistics was founded and developed in the 1970s and 1980s by 
linguists disappointed in generative grammar developed by Noam Chomsky and 
his  followers.  Chomsky’s  theory  focuses  on  the  ideal  language  user  whose 
language competence is based on ‘pure’ grammar, free of any extra-linguistic 
influences. In this way language can be treated as a relatively small set of rules 
which can generate all correct language structures. All speech-acts eluding this 
dry formalisation are treated as incorrect or going beyond the field of linguistics. 
As a result, language appears to be thoroughly predictable and every speech-act 
can be unambiguously proclaimed as correct or not. Thus generative grammar 
may  be  viewed  as  an  attempt  of  legitimising  language  in  one  way  only,  of 
submitting it to one category of truth and thus – as an attempt of inscribing 
language in the general modernist outlook. 
In  general,  modernism  was  a  product  of  the  Enlightenment, although its 
roots  go  back  to  Descartes’  cogito.  With  the  Enlightenment,  the  rationalism 
implicit  in  the  Cartesian  approach  was  taken  as  the  foundation  for  a  whole 
culture. Human understanding became a quest for the only truth and the means 
was Kant’s pure reason. What could not be understood in this way, was simply 
dismissed as illusion and superstition. Such a pursuit of unity and order, creation 
of one objective knowledge and a clear division between truth and falsehood is 
also characteristic of generative linguistics. 
Cognitive linguistics departs from such a way of thinking. It notices that in 
the  conditions  of  real  communication  language  structures  proposed  by 
generative  linguistics  as  the  only  correct  represent  only  a  small  part  of  all 
speech-acts. Cognitive linguists see the advantages of rigorous formalisation; 
nevertheless,  they  would  like  to  go  beyond  the  confines  of  structuralist 
objectivism (see Tababkowska (1995:5)). Treating language as a direct reflection 
of  cognitive  processes  which  take  place  in  human  mind  and  thus  as  a  
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phenomenon  to  a  great  extent  subjective,  they  repudiate  the  possibility  of  a 
complete formalisation of language and establishing general rules reflecting the 
objective  truth  about  language.  In  this  way  they  accede  to  the  paradigm  of 
thinking that came to be known as postmodernism. 
Postmodernism  gives  up  hope  for  the  integrating  power  of  the  absolute 
truth, because, according to postmodernists, there is not any absolute truth. It is 
impossible to reflect reality in an objective way, to establish rules governing the 
world, to submit plurality of knowledges to one way of legitimatizing. In the 
time of a global range of means of communication postmodernism discovers 
completely new conditions of human existence in the ‘post-industrial’ society 
and propagates the decline of a uniform, totalising vision of the world. History 
becomes ‘decentralised’ and universal history is no longer possible. Thus, space 
for the plurality of particular visions and multiplicity of discourses appears. The 
uniformity of the world is broken and the vision of chaos and entropy takes its 
place; individualism and diversity are raised to the rank of universal rule and 
rational knowledge is replaced by ‘language games’. 
However, the relationship between cognitivism and postmodernism is not 
confined to the adherence to the same paradigm. Below, I will make an attempt 
to present several postmodernist texts in which problems and the way of dealing 
with them indicate closer analogies with cognitivism. 
Foucault (1992:971) describes [...] the last ten, fifteen, at most twenty years 
as a period characterised by what one might term the efficacy of dispersed and 
discontinuous  offensives
1.  These  offensives  lack  any  systematic  rules  of  co-
ordination  which  might  provide  a  system  of  reference  for  them  and  their 
criticism  is  directed  against  traditional  morality  and  hierarchy,  which  are 
reflected in the established institutions and practices. They have generally local 
character  which  indicates  [...]  an  autonomous,  non-centralised  kind  of 
theoretical production, one that is to say whose validity is not dependent on the 
approval of the established regimes of thought (see Foucault (1992:972)). 
What  is  connected  with  this  amazing  efficacy  of  local  criticisms  is  the 
inhibiting  effect  of  global,  totalitarian  theories  and  [...]  an  insurrection  of 
subjugated  knowledges  (see  Foucault  (1992:972)).  These  subjugated 
knowledges consist of two things. On the one hand, they are created by these 
parts  of  historical  knowledge  which  were  present but hidden in the body of 
functionalist and systematizing theory and which criticism based on scholarship 
has been able to reveal.  
On  the  other  hand,  subjugated  knowledges  comprise  also  what  Foucault 
(1992) calls popular knowledge, that is this part of knowledge that has been 
disqualified  as  inadequate  to  its  task  or  insufficiently  elaborated  –  naive 
knowledges situated in the hierarchy below the required level of scientificity, 
 
1 Written in 1976.  
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that is knowledges created by people for themselves. However, Foucault (1992) 
does not associate these knowledges with the generally accepted common-sense 
knowledge,  on  the  contrary  -  they  are  particular  knowledges,  local  and 
incapable of unanimity. 
In this place one cannot but think about the return of cognitivism to the 
nineteenth  century  classics  of  Indo-European  linguistics  and  about  its 
admission of great importance in language of the personal creativity of every 
language user. These two shifts postulated by cognitivism, however, do not 
mean a departure from the fundamental rules of Saussure’s structuralism. But 
an insurrection of subjugated knowledges is not a call for ignorance, either - it 
does not negate knowledge. It is the insurrection of knowledges, as Foucault 
(1992:974) puts it:  
[...] that are opposed primarily not to the contents, methods or concepts of science, 
but  to  the  effects  of  the  centralising  powers  which  are  linked  to  the  institution  and 
functioning of an organised scientific discourse within a society such as ours. 
It is an attempt of freeing discourses from the yoke of a unifying theory 
which tries to level all oppositions to general forms of thought in the name of 
some true knowledge and some arbitrary idea of what creates knowledge and its 
subject. Subjugated knowledges do not bend things to a common denominator 
(as generative grammar does, trying to cram the whole language into the rigid 
framework  of  its  system),  but  try  to  find  common  ground  in  the  way  of 
describing  them.  As  observed  by  Tabakowska  (1995:13),  cognitivism  acts 
similarly when it tries to establish correlatives between  
[...] perceptive [...] and conceptual [...] processes; between what is innate [...] and 
what is acquired [...]; between the world and mind; between seemingly chaotic disorder 
of language which we know from experience and rigorous elegance of language data 
presented by ‘‘pure’’ theory
2. 
The next text I am going to link to the cognitivist theory of language is 
Barthes’  (1986)  From  Work  to  Text.  In  this  article  Barthes  writes  about  a 
change in the approach to products of culture. In this new approach the work, 
for  example  a  work  of  art,  which  is  a  self-contained,  closed  entity  whose 
meaning is presupposed before all the acts of perception, is replaced by the 
Text,  whose  meaning  cannot  be  described  univocally  as  it  depends  on  the 
context in which it occurs. Such a differentiation between the work and the 
Text  is,  to  some  extent,  parallel  to  the  differentiation  between  the  ‘main-
stream’  linguistics  and  cognitive  linguistics.  What  is  more,  many  features 
which, according to Barthes, characterise the Text can be directly linked to 
some features characterising language in the cognitivist approach. 
 
2 Translation mine.  
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One of the main characteristics of the Text is plurality. Barthes (1986:60) 
compares the reader of the Text to someone having a stroll:  
[...] what he perceives is multiple, irreducible, issuing from heterogeneous, detached 
substances and levels: lights, colours, vegetation, heat, air, tenuous explosions of sound, 
tiny cries of birds, children’s voices from the other side of the valley, paths, gestures, 
garments  of  inhabitants  close  by  or  very  far  away;  all  these  incidents  are  half 
identifiable: they issue from known codes, but their combinative operation is unique. 
Cognitive linguistics sees language in a similar way: language cannot be 
reduced  to  a  small  set  of  rules.  Each  language  user  has  access  to  the  same 
language material but he uses it in a unique way, characteristic of him only. 
The next thing peculiar to the Text is, according to Barthes (1986:59), the 
logic governing it. This logic [...] is not comprehensive (trying to define what 
the work ‘‘means”) but metonymic. The meaning of the Text cannot be defined 
univocally (which happens in the case of the meaning of the work), but only 
through associations, the impression of closeness. 
In  this  place  it  is  not  difficult  to  see  resemblance  to  the  cognitive 
categorisation  by  prototype  and  the  network  model  of  categories.  Classical 
theories of category assume invariability and clearness of boundaries between 
individual categories, internal definability of categories and binarity of defining 
characteristics  (see  Tabakowska  1995:38).  These  categories  are  to  reflect 
categories  existing  in  the  surrounding  world.  They  have  clearly  defined 
boundaries which are not dependent on the context, therefore every phenomenon 
can be univocally ascribed to a particular category on the basis of an appropriate 
definition.  Thus  one  can  say  that  the  logic  governing  classical  theories  of 
category is comprehensive.  
However, according to cognitive linguistics, such a way of categorisation 
does not reflect reality, where most of the phenomena have scalar character. Let 
us quote Tabakowska (1995:39): 
First of all, cognitive categories created by human mind generally do not agree with 
the ‘‘real’’ categories of the world which surrounds us: they create the image of the 
world which we see and believe in and not the world as it is in reality
3. 
 Therefore, according to cognitivism, categorisation by prototype and the 
network model of categories is much more adequate. In such a categorisation the 
role of the prototype is assumed by a specimen which seems to embody ‘the 
best’ features of a given category. The remaining elements are included in the 
category  on  the  basis  of  their  resemblance  to  the  prototype.  Included,  they 
themselves can in turn become prototypes for the next elements. Thus a network 
is created. One of the main types of such a resemblance to the prototype which 
places an element in a given category is the metonymic resemblance. So one can 
 
3 Translation mine.  
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venture to claim that the logic governing the cognitive theory of category is, at 
least partially, metonymic.  
At last, according to Barthes (1986:61), the work can be compared to an 
[...]organism which grows by vital expansion, by ‘development’ . Whereas the 
metaphor of the Text is that of the network - [...] if the text expands, it is by the 
effect of a combinative operation, of a systematics (see Barthes (1986:61)). In 
the  generative  model  certain  structures  are  created  from  simpler  structures, 
which  are  then  considered  as  original  structures.  So,  it  is  a  clear  case  of 
development. In the cognitivist approach to language there are no original and 
secondary  structures  –  the  variety  of  structures  is  the  result  of  combination 
which does not have a hierarchical character, but just reflects different ways of 
seeing things.  
The next text which shows similarities to cognitive linguistics due to its 
approach to culture is Rhizome, written by Deleuze and Guatari (1988). In their 
work the authors contrast the culture of the tree, the culture whose main pattern 
is that of an entity which develops according to the binary logic into a set of 
smaller  branches,  with  the  culture  of  the  rhizome,  an  acentric  and  non-
hierarchical  system  whose  basic  pattern  is  that  of  plurality.  According  to 
Deleuze and Guatari (1988:229): We should no longer believe in trees or roots, 
we have tolerated them for far too long. The whole culture of the tree type, from 
biology to linguistics, is based on them
4. 
Deleuze and Guatari (1988:224) univocally criticise Chomsky’s grammar 
claiming that it defends the tree-root as a basic image. Its main blame is that it 
does not link language with the semantic and pragmatic contents of a statement, 
with  collective  instruments  of  expression,  with  the  whole  micropolitics  of  a 
social field 
5. Rhizome, on the conrtrary, 
[...] would not cease to join semiotic cells, organisations of power, circumstances 
referring to arts, sciences, social fights. A semiotic cell is like a bulb gathering various 
acts, linguistic but also perceptive, mimic, mental: there is no language in itself nor 
common speech but only co-operation of dialects, jargons, cants, specialist languages. 
There  is  no  ideal  pair  speaker  –  listener,  as  there  is  no  homogeneous  language 
community
6 (see Deleuze and Guatari (1988:224)). 
There is no doubt that this criticism of Chomsky’s theory reflects almost 
exactly the principles of cognitive linguistics. 
According  to  Deleuze  and  Guatari  (1988)  the  systems  of  the  tree  are 
hierarchical systems in which the order of elements is established rigidly and the 
boundaries between particular structures are unambiguously determined. In the 
 
4 Translation mine. 
5 Translation mine. 
6 Translation mine.  
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rhizome the structures are not segregated so categorically. Deleuze and Guatari 
(1988:225) argue that: 
The  rhizome  may  be  severed,  broken  off  at  any  point  but  it  continues  to  move 
forward  along  some  of  its  own  or  alien  lines  (...)  Each  rhizome  contains  lines  of 
segmentation, according to which it is stratified, territorialized, organised, marked, etc.; 
but also lines of deterritorialization, which continually serve as its routes of escape.(...) 
These lines continuously refer to each other.
7 
Taking into consideration theories of category in language, the rhizome may 
be treated as an opposition of classical theories of category characterised by 
binarity of defining properties: 
In contrast to a structure which is determined on the basis of a number of points and 
positions,  binary  relationships  between  these  points  and  mutually  univocal  relations 
between  the  positions,  the  rhizome  is  made  only  of  lines:  lines  of  segmentation  and 
stratification as the maximum dimension along which plurality moves, transforming its 
own nature 
8(see Deleuze and Guatari (1988:234)). 
Thus the system of the rhizome seems to reflect the cognitivist theory of 
categories, which sees the scalar nature of most phenomena - the boundaries 
between categories are blurred and categories overlap one another. One could 
say that particular categories neither begin nor end but ‘are transformed’ into 
other categories. 
A similar line of argument to that presented in Rhizome is developed in 
Umberto Eco’s (1984) Semiotics and the Philosophy of Language. It is not a 
strictly postmodernist manifesto, as Rhizome is, but its philosophy is certainly 
postmodernist. The main theme of the work is that of the opposition between the 
structure of a dictionary and the structure of an encyclopaedia. The idea of a 
dictionary represents that model for definition which is structured by genera and 
species,  a  model  which  is  finite  and  hierarchical  and  can  be  depicted  as  a 
bidimensional tree. It is characteristic of the language of traditional linguistics, 
understood as a closed and static system. However, this model, according to 
Eco, is untenable. One cannot interpret satisfactorily a linguistic sign relying on 
genera and species, that is – on a finite set of substances in a hierarchical order. 
The main fault of the model of a dictionary is that it is either reliable but its 
scope is limited or it has an unlimited scope but is unreliable. Therefore, in order 
to give the representation of the content of a given lexical item one has to resort 
to  differentiae  and  accidents.  If  differentiae  may  be  described  as  essential 
qualities  of  substantial  form,  accidents  correspond  to  differentiae  in  their 
capacity  as  signs. As  Eco  (1984:67)  puts  it:  Essential  differences  cannot  be 
known directly by us; we know (we infer!) them by semiotic means, through the 
 
7 Translation mine. 
8 Translation mine.  
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effects  (accidents)  they  produce,  and  these  accidents  are  the  sign  of  their 
unknowable cause. Accidents are infinite, or at least indefinite, in number and 
they are not hierarchical, either. In this way the apparent order of a dictionary is 
replaced by an unrestricted encyclopaedia. Let us quote Eco (1984:68) at this 
point: 
The  tree  o  genera  and  species,  the  tree  of  substances,  blows  up  in  a  dust  of 
differentiae, in a turmoil of infinite accidents, in a nonhierarchical network of qualia. 
The dictionary is dissolved into a potentially unordered and unrestricted galaxy of pieces 
of world knowledge. The dictionary thus becomes and encyclopedia, because it was in 
fact a disguised encyclopedia. 
This  encyclopaedia-like  representation  of  the  semantic  competence  no 
longer  has  a  hierarchical  structure  of  a  tree  but  it  takes  the  format  of  a 
multidimensional network and Eco himself admits that the best image of such a 
network is provided by Deleuze and Guatari (1988).  
In  an  encyclopaedia-like representation linguistic signs are interpreted in 
relation to other signs, which in turn can be interpreted in relation to still other 
signs
9. A  background  encyclopaedic  knowledge,  according  to  Eco  (1984:68), 
assumes [...] the form of a set of instructions for the proper textual insertion of 
the terms of a language into a series of contexts (as classes of co-texts) and for 
the correct disambiguation of the same terms when met within a given co-text. In 
consequence the borderline between semantics and pragmatics becomes blurred. 
This overlapping of semantics and world knowledge is also one of the main 
characteristics of cognitive linguistics.  
The  similarity  between  an  encyclopaedia-like  representation  of  the 
semantic  competence  and  cognitive  semantics may be seen most clearly in 
their approach to the metaphor. According to Eco (1984:113), the format of a 
dictionary does not permit us to understand the mechanism of the metaphor. In 
this  format  the  metaphor  is  explained  as  a  transfer  of  semantic  properties 
(specifying the place of a linguistic sign in the hierarchical tree of genera and 
species). And thus in the sentence That girl is a birch the word girl acquires 
the property ‘vegetal’ or birch the property ‘human’. But this tells us very 
little  about  what  happens  in  the  interpretation  of  this  metaphor.  An 
encyclopedic semantics is therefore better equipped to deal with the metaphor. 
As Eco (1984:113) argues: 
 
9 Eco (1972:58) understands a sign as a tripartite structure, having at its base its symbol 
linked to the object which the symbol represents, and at its top – its interpretant. Eco (1972:58) 
defines interpretant as [...] another representation referring to the same object. In other words, if 
one wants to establish what is the interpretant of a given sign, one has to name it by means of 
another sign, which in turn has its own interpretant, which can be named by another sign – and so 
on. In this way a process of unlimited semiosis begins. [translation mine]  
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A  componential  representation  in  the  format  of  an  encylopedia,  however,  is 
potentially infinite and assumes the form of (...) a polydimensional network of properties, 
in  which  some  properties  are  the  interpretants  of  others.  In  the  absence  of  such  a 
network,  none  of  these  properties  can  attain  the  rank  of  being  a  metalinguistic 
construction or a unit belonging to a privileged set of semantic universals.  
And thus in the above example the privileged semantic property allowing us 
to understand the metaphor is named by the interpretant FLEXIBLE, which is 
common for both girl and birch. 
A  similar  explanation  of  the  understanding  of  the  mechanism  of  the 
metaphor is provided by cognitive semantics. In cognitive linguistics semantic 
structures  are  viewed  as  related  to  cognitive,  or  conceptual,  domains.  A 
conceptual domain may be defined as [...] an open set of attributive values with 
respect  to  which  semantic  structures  associated  with  lexical  categories  are 
defined  and  compared  (see  Kleparski  (1997:73)).  What  happens  in  the 
mechanism of the metaphor is that some attributive values of one linguistic item 
become more salient than others and they, as Kleparski (1997:92) puts it, [...] 
somehow  translate  the  conceptually  matching  values  specifiable  for  the 
semantics of another linguistic item. And thus, in the above example one of the 
attributive values of domain of physical characteristics of the linguistic item 
girl,  namely  FLEXIBLE,  is  viewed  as  translatable  into  the  conceptually 
matching attributive value FLEXIBLE of domain of physical characteristics of 
the lexical category birch.  
In  both  the  explanations  of  the  mechanism  of  the  metaphor  certain 
subsections  of  the  meaning  structures  of  two  linguistic  items  attain  salient 
positions and are viewed as mutually interchangeable, in this way providing the 
basis for comparison. 
To conclude, both postmodernism and cognitivism testify to what Lyotard 
(1992:999) calls the end of grand narratives, that is metadiscourses (like the 
project of the Enlightenment) which tried to submit the plurality of discourses to 
one  category  of  truth.  It  is  the  stress  on  plurality  that  is  the  most  striking 
characteristic of cognitive linguistics and all the postmodernist texts presented in 
the  foregoing. The  cognitivist  plurality  of  language  competences  reflects  the 
postmodernist  plurality  of  knowledges,  of  the  Text,  of  the  rhizome,  of  the 
encyclopaedia. There is no univocal interpretation and no objective truth. There 
is only the plurality of views on the world. 
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